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ABSTRACT 
 
There is little empirical evidence on the relationship between organizational risk 
managers and the adoption of hazard adjustments (measures taken to reduce risks from extreme 
events). Similarly, the risk perception literature is mixed on the relationship between risk 
perception and the adoption of hazard adjustments in organizations. This study empirically 
addresses these two gaps using data collected from 227 public, private, and non-profit 
organizations in the Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee in 2006. This study finds a 
significant positive relationship between risk managers and the adoption of hazard adjustments. 
The results also indicate that organizational risk perception has a small positive influence on the 
adoption of hazard adjustments.  
 
 
Keywords: Organizational risk perception; risk manager; mitigation and preparedness measures; 
hazard adjustments; disasters 
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Introduction 
  
The losses from global disasters continue to increase each year (Guha-Sapir et al., 2012; Munich 
Reinsurance Group, 2008). In light of those increases, there is a pressing need to study the ways 
organizations not only perceive the threat of natural and technological disasters, but also how 
they manage the consequences of such events. Organizations have relatively more control over 
technological risks like structural fires and chemical spills compared to natural disaster risks 
such as hurricanes and tornadoes. Obviously, organizations cannot prevent natural disasters from 
occurring, but they can mitigate and prepare for the potential consequences (Sadiq, 2009; 2010). 
‘Hazard mitigation consists of practices that are implemented before impact and provide passive 
protection at the time impact occurs. By contrast, emergency preparedness practices involve the 
development of plans and procedures, the recruitment and training of staff, and the acquisition of 
facilities, equipment, and materials needed to provide active protection during emergency 
response’ (Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences, 2006:86). Mitigation and 
preparedness measures are feasible for both natural disasters (e.g., strengthening of the structural 
elements of office buildings and installing smoke detectors) and technological ones (e.g., steel 
casings around oil and gas wells). Since the adoption of hazard adjustments by organizations 
may help ameliorate the impacts of disasters, it is worth exploring organizational characteristics 
that predict hazard adjustments. Hazard adjustments are “…actions that intentionally or 
unintentionally reduce risk from extreme events in the natural environment” (Lindell and Perry, 
2000, p. 461-462). 
Preliminary evidence from the disaster literature suggests that an organizational risk 
manager is important in disaster planning (Sadiq and Weible, 2010). A risk manager, among 
other duties, is responsible for informing employees about the risks their organization is 
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susceptible to, the hazard adjustments the organization is using to address those risks, and what 
employees should do in the event of a disaster (e.g., whether or not employees should evacuate 
the building or shelter in place during a particular disaster). Unfortunately, there is little 
empirical evidence that the presence of a designated risk manager is associated with the adoption 
of hazard adjustments in organizations.  
In addition, the risk perception literature is mixed on the relationship between risk 
perception and the adoption of hazard adjustments. Studies have found a positive and significant 
relationship between risk perception and preparedness (Han and Nigg, 2011; Sadiq, 2009), while 
others have found otherwise (e.g., Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell, 2000). This study contributes 
some evidence to this debate. Thus, the purpose of this study is to empirically answer two 
research questions in the context of both technological and natural disasters. (1) “Is having a risk 
manager associated with the adoption of hazard adjustments?” (2) “What is the relationship 
between risk perception and the adoption of hazard adjustments at the organizational level?”  
Data collected from 227 public, private, and non-profit organizations in the 
Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee in 2006 were used to provide answers. This study finds 
a significant positive relationship between the presence of risk managers in an organization and 
the adoption of hazard adjustments. The results also indicate that organizational risk perception 
has a significant positive relationship with the adoption of hazard adjustments. Our study adds to 
the literature on how organizations perceive both technological and natural hazard risks and 
respond to them (Alberto, 2011; Dynes and Drabek, 1994; Fowler, Kling, and Larson, 2007; 
Leveson et al., 2009; Light, 2008; Mitchell, 1995; Penrose, 2000; Sadiq, 2011; Schulman and 
Roe, 2007).  
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The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses relevant literature on the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness (hazard adjustments). It is followed by a 
presentation of the methodology, data collection procedures, and the results. Finally, the study 
concludes by highlighting an agenda for future research in hazard adjustments at the 
organizational level.  
 
Literature Review 
 
In this section, we review the determinants of mitigation and preparedness measures, but with a 
primary focus on two determinants:  risk managers and risk perception. It is important to note 
that a majority of the studies examined were conducted in the United States. 
 
Determinants of Mitigation and Preparedness Measures (Hazard Adjustments) 
 
One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival (Shafritz, Ott, and Jang, 2005). 
Survival is so important that organizational theorists have devoted much time to studying how 
organizations manage to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Disasters constantly threaten this 
goal by causing organizational disruption (Lindell and Perry, 2007), loss of sales and property 
taxes (Tierney, 1994), and loss of services from public, private, and non-profit organizations.   
The challenge for organizations is to find ways of ensuring continuity of operations                                                   
during and after disasters. Organizations stand a better chance of surviving disasters and 
continuing their day-to-day operations if they have preparedness and mitigation strategies in 
place before disasters strike (McManus and Carr, 2001). In the remainder of this section, we will 
discuss the determinants of mitigation and preparedness.  
Risk Manager 
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An organizational risk manager is defined in this study as a designated employee (full-time or 
part-time) charged with designing, adopting, and/or implementing a range of risk management 
programs. The risk manager assesses organizational vulnerability to disasters and communicates 
potential risks and planned responses to organizational members through videos, pamphlets, and 
e-mails (Ward, 2001). Prior studies have established the important roles risk managers play in 
managing the risks faced by organizations (Corbett, 2004; Sadiq and Weible, 2010; Yoon, 
Youngs, and Abe, 2012), while others have studied the roles of risk managers in organizations 
(Ward, 2001).  To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study—Yoon, Youngs, and Abe 
(2012)—that studied the relationship between risk manager and the adoption of hazard 
adjustments in organizations. Yoon, Youngs, and Abe, (2012) examined the factors that are 
associated with the development of FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Plans using Census data 
(N=50), they found that financial resources and disaster experience were influential factors in the 
development of FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Plans. However, they found a positive, but 
insignificant relationship between local emergency managers and the development of FEMA-
approved Hazard Mitigation Plans. As a result of limited research on risk managers and hazard 
adjustments, this study examines the first research question: “Is having a risk manager associated 
with the adoption of hazard adjustments?”  
An important factor in establishing an effective risk management program is the presence 
of a risk manager (Ward, 2001). Organizations might create a risk management office 
(centralized structure), headed by the risk manager, to implement and oversee risk management 
programs (Ward, 2001) or distribute the risk management function throughout the organization 
(decentralized structure) (Hage, 1965; Vitez, 2014; Zaharia, 2012). Centralization is a measure of 
power distribution in an organization (Hage, 1965). Under centralization, the risk manager has 
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the power to make risk management decisions and provide risk management direction for the 
organization (Vitez, 2014). Under the decentralized organizational structure, multiple individuals 
or departments are responsible for making risk management decisions (Vitez, 2014). 
Organizations may hire risk managers with the expectation that they will help 
organizations gauge future risks, inform management of vulnerabilities, and promote steps to 
reduce risks from both technological risks and natural hazards. Ward (2001) notes that risk 
managers are in charge of developing and implementing risk management programs. This 
argument, which suggests a positive association between the presence of a risk manager in an 
organization and the adoption of hazard adjustments, provides the basis for Hypothesis 1.  
There is, however, a counter argument. Organizations might hire risk managers to create 
a false sense of security (or to foster an illusion of activity). In other words, organizations might 
hire a risk manager to signal to its employees that the organization is taking appropriate steps to 
manage its risks. Moreover, the hiring of a risk manager alone might lead executives and 
managers within the organization to develop too much confidence (a false sense of security) in 
the organization’s risk-reducing activity (Pearson and Clair, 1998). Consequently, organizations 
may not provide the resources/authority that risk managers need to carry out risk management 
functions or grant access to higher-level decision making (Corbett, 2004). A recent survey in the 
United States on business recovery planning strategies revealed that a majority of the businesses 
surveyed were displaying a false sense of security (Pearce, 2013). Specifically, the survey found 
that most of the businesses had disaster recovery plans, but two-thirds of them relied on manual 
recovery processes, which may not meet recovery targets predetermined by the businesses 
(Pearce, 2013). 
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The notion of false sense of security is related to the organizational concept of a paper 
plan syndrome (Auf der Heide, 1989; Pearson and Clair, 1998) and the notion of fantasy 
document or fantasy planning (Clarke, 1999). The meaning of this concept is that an organization 
has a disaster plan on paper, but never fully implements it or even trains employees according to 
the plan. According to Auf der Heide (1989: 23), ‘one of the greatest impediments to disaster 
preparedness is the tendency to believe that it can be accomplished merely by the completion of 
a written plan.’ Additionally, Pearson and Clair (1998) argue that the existence of policies and 
procedures alone may give false signals of preparedness. Similarly, Clarke (1999: 16) maintains 
that such plans are ‘imaginative fictions about what people hope will happen when things go 
wrong’.  
In summary, one should not assume that the mere presence of a risk manager will 
necessarily be associated with the adoption of hazard adjustments.  An organization may exhibit 
the trappings of responsible risk management (e.g., a plan and a designated manager) but, in 
reality, undertake little or no risk management.  Thus, Hypothesis 2 gives weight to the 
possibility of organizational illusion. 
 
H1: An organization with a risk manager is more likely than an organization without a 
risk manager to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. 
H2: An organization with a risk manager is less likely than an organization without a risk 
manager to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. 
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Risk Perception at the Organizational Level 
 
Defining and Measuring Risk Perception. In this study, risk perception is defined as the 
combination of the perceived likelihood and the perceived consequences of an activity or 
technology (Bubeck, Botzen, and Aerts., 2012). According to the Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983), threat appraisal, which is also referred to as risk perception 
by Grothmann and Reusswig (2006), is measured as the combination of perceived probability 
and perceived consequences. Some studies have measured risk perception as a combination of 
the two concepts (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006), while others have measured risk perception 
as perceived probability only (Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006). Our survey did not seek to 
disentangle probability and consequences, instead, like some previous perception studies, our 
study measured the more integrative concept of degree of worry. 
Studies of risk perceptions typically ask a respondent directly about their degree of 
concern/worry (or lack thereof) or about their view of danger to society as a whole (Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich, 2000; Slovic, 1987).  Siegrist and Cvetkovich, (2000: 715) measured perceived risk 
by asking respondents the following question: “In general, how risky do you consider each of the 
following items to be for the United States society as a whole?” In our study, risk perception was 
measured by asking respondents to rate the worry level for their organization. The specific 
question in the survey is: “Using the thermometer scale below, please indicate the extent to 
which you perceive the following disasters are a worry for your organization”, on a scale of 0 (no 
worry at all), 50 (moderate worry), and 100 (a great deal of worry). The survey then listed 15 
different disasters (Bird flu/pandemics, chemical spills, drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, 
extreme winds/tornadoes, fires, flooding, hurricanes, ice storms, severe storms, terrorist attacks, 
toxic releases, violent crimes, and water pollution).  
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Related Literature on Risk Perception. Some researchers have examined risk perception at the 
household (Lindell, 2013) and organizational levels (Han and Nigg, 2011), but most risk 
perception research has focused on individual risk perception and how risk perception relates to 
individual choice such as the acceptability of risk  (Helsloot and Ruitenberg 2004; Slovic, 1987; 
Slovic, 2000). With regard to the type of risks, previous researchers have studied individuals risk 
perception of technological risks (Bubeck, Botzen, and Aerts., 2012; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 2000; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1980), environmental or natural hazards (Mileti and 
Darlington, 1997; Perry and Lindell, 2008; Solberg, Rossetto, and Joffe., 2010; Wachinger et al., 
2013), and a combination of the two (Fowler, Kling, and Larson, 2007; Sadiq, 2009).  
The risk perception literature is mixed on the relationship between risk perception and 
hazard adjustments. The current study contributes to this debate by examining the second 
research question: “What is the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of hazard 
adjustments at the organizational level?” Studies that have found a positive and significant 
relationship between risk perception and preparedness include Han and Nigg (2011) and Sadiq 
(2009). Perry and Lindell (1997) also found that managers’ risk perceptions had a significant 
correlation with the adoption of hazard adjustments within their agency. In addition, Lindell and 
Perry’s (2000) summary of 23 earthquake studies and Lindell’s (2013) summary of 20 
correlations related to a variety of hazards found a generally positive relationship between risk 
perception and risk-management measures.  
This study employs the Crisis Management Process Model of Pearson and Clair (1998) as 
the conceptual guide to understanding the relationship between risk perception and the adoption 
of hazard adjustments in organizations. Pearson and Clair’s (1998) model consists of three 
primary pre-event constructs and organizational crisis outcome concepts.  The focus of this study 
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is on the pre-event constructs: environmental context of organizations (e.g., institutionalized 
practices and industry regulations), executive perceptions of risks, and the adoption of 
organizational crisis management preparations. We focus particularly on the relationship 
between executive perceptions of risks and the adoption of organizational crisis management 
preparations. Pearson and Clair’s (1998: 69) model proposes that ‘…executive perception about 
risk … will foster adoption of crisis management programs.’ In short, Pearson and Clair’s model 
and the above studies that show a positive significant relationship between risk perception and 
hazard adjustments provide the conceptual basis for hypothesis 3.  
 
H3: Organizational risk perception leads to the adoption of mitigation and preparedness 
measures. 
 
Organizational Size 
 
Researchers have found that larger organizations are more likely to mitigate and prepare for 
disasters than smaller organizations (Drabek, 1991; Drabek, 1994a; Drabek, 1994b; Drabek, 
1995; Quarantelli et al., 1979; Sadiq, 2010, 2015). Furthermore, studies have shown that, among 
a variety of independent variables tested, firm size is the most consistent (Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza, 1997) and important (Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer, 2000) predictor of 
organizational mitigation and preparedness. One interpretation is that larger firms devote more 
resources to disaster mitigation and preparedness than smaller firms, presumably because larger 
firms have more resources available to them and have more to lose (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 
1997; Mileti and Darlington, 1997; Tierney, 2006). Resource availability has been found to be a 
significant predictor of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level, as well as at the 
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household (Mileti, 1999) and community (May and Birkland, 1994) level. Firm size may also act 
merely as a surrogate for a variety of other variables that are difficult to measure like the 
planning horizon of executives and the presence of professionalized boards of directors with a 
stake in the organization’s future. Thus, the organizational size variable is best understood as 
capturing the influence of a variety of predictive factors that are correlated with the size of the 
organization. 
Ownership Pattern 
    
Organizational ownership patterns—whether the organization is a single firm or a franchise— 
may be related to the adoption of hazard adjustments. Empirical evidence suggests that 
franchises do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than single firms. Drabek (1991, 1994a, 
1994b, 1995) found firms that were part of a larger chain engaged in more disaster evacuation 
planning than single firms did. This finding is consistent with that of Quarantelli et al. (1979) 
who found that national chemical companies were more prepared than single local chemical 
firms. Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) provide a possible explanation for this finding by arguing 
that this difference could be due to the preparedness mandates given by corporate headquarters to 
local chapters.  
Organizational Sector  
 
Some sectors engage in more mitigation and preparedness than others. Drabek (1991, 1994a, 
1994b, 1995) found that there was a significant relationship between business type and disaster 
evacuation planning, with lodging businesses having more extensive disaster evacuation plans 
than restaurants, entertainment businesses, and firms in the travel industry. Similarly, in their 
study of 54 firms on preparedness for earthquakes in San Francisco, Mileti et al. (1993) found an 
indirect relationship between firm type and earthquake preparedness. Further, Dahlhamer and 
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D’Souza (1997) found that businesses in finance, insurance, and real estate are better prepared 
for disasters than businesses in other sectors. This finding might be explained by the higher 
degree of regulation and oversight in this sector (Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamar,2000), though 
adequate measures of regulation and oversight have not yet been developed to test this 
hypothesis rigorously. 
Disaster Impact  
 
Research on risk and disaster visualizations suggests that information on the potential impacts of 
disasters can motivate people to take steps to reduce their risks (Sandman, Weinstein, and Miller 
1994). In other words, a high level of awareness and concern about the impact of disasters may 
result in greater engagement in preparedness activities (Nigg, 1996). Indeed, a series of studies 
conducted on mitigation and preparedness among organizations in Memphis, Tennessee found 
significant positive associations between concern over the impact of both technological and 
natural disasters and the adoption of mitigation and preparedness measures (Sadiq, 2009; Sadiq, 
2010).   
Internal Organizational Obstacles  
 
This study defines internal obstacles to disaster mitigation and preparedness as factors inside an 
organization that inhibit the ability of the organization to mitigate and prepare for disasters. We 
consider three major categories of internal obstacles: lack of information, lack of managerial and 
rank-and-file member motivation/support, and lack of financial resources.  
The acquisition of information (e.g., forecasts of future disasters) is an important 
ingredient to disaster preparedness (Huss, Sadiq, and Weible, 2012; Major, 1998; Perry and 
Lindell, 1997) because it helps organizations understand their vulnerabilities and guides choices 
about how to allocate resources toward mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It is 
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also important that management and rank-and-file members of the organization are motivated to 
support the adoption of mitigation and preparedness measures (Whitney, Dickerson, and Lindell, 
2001). Finally, a lack of financial resources is likely to inhibit an organization from adopting 
measures (Bostrom, Turaga, and Ponomariov, 2006; Pearson and Clair, 1998; Wyner and Mann, 
1986).  Because these three obstacles can hinder the ability of a risk manager to carry out his/her 
risk management function or can discourage an organization from adopting hazard adjustments, 
it is necessary to control for them in the analysis. By controlling for these obstacles, the 
influences of risk manager and risk perception on hazard adjustments can be better understood. 
The focus on internal organizational obstacles is not intended to deny the importance of external 
factors influencing organizational readiness. Information on external obstacles were not included 
in the survey.  
 
Methods 
 
In this section, the procedure for data collection is outlined along with a discussion of the 
uniqueness of the data. Variable measurements, including the specific survey questions used for 
measuring the values of the variables, are presented. Following variable measurement is a 
discussion of the choice of statistical technique-ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic 
regressions.  
 
Data Collection 
 
Data were collected from the Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee, in 2006, an area where 
earthquake hazards are of particular concern due to actuarial experience. One of the authors was 
a member of a research team that collected these data from a sample of public, private, and non-
profit organizations. The research team began by conducting exploratory interviews with fifteen 
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different organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee. Interviewees were asked open-
ended questions about the type of actions their organizations had taken in respect to risk, as well 
as their attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information. The interviews were 
conducted either in person or via telephone in the spring and summer of 2006.  Each interview 
took approximately 30-60 minutes. Following those interviews, the research team processed the 
responses and returned them to the interviewees to verify accuracy. The results of the 
exploratory interviews were then used to develop the survey instrument utilized in phase two.  
In the fall of 2006, a survey was mailed to 733 organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, 
Tennessee. The two-part survey consisted of (1) questions regarding risk issues in organizations 
and the actions organizations were taking to address risks and (2) questions about demographic 
characteristics of the respondents. The survey was distributed using a stratified sampling 
technique. With the help of the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, the research team 
queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA, using number of employees as a key index 
variable to allow organizations of all sizes in the Memphis Metropolitan Area to be surveyed and 
represented in sufficient numbers. The categories ranged from no employees to over 9,999 
employees. The research team re-categorized the number of employees into seven distinct 
categories (1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and ≥ 500) and randomly selected 100 
organizations from each of the first six categories, all 101 organizations from the seventh 
category, and then added 32 utility companies1 in Memphis/Shelby County area for a total of 733 
organizations.  
The survey was administered using a modification of Dillman’s total design method, 
which is designed to achieve optimum response rates by using a system of re-mailings and 
reminders (Dillman, 2000). Using the letterhead of the University of Memphis, the team mailed a 
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letter to each of the 733 organizations describing the study and seeking participation. Following 
this, the research team mailed the first batch of surveys and follow-up postcards. Then, a second 
batch of surveys was sent out. Of the 733 organizations, 227 returned the survey, yielding a 
response rate of 31 per cent. This response rate is within the range achieved by previous 
organizational-level studies on disasters (e.g., the response rate for Han and Nigg (2011) was 
33.6 per cent). Although the survey was addressed to the owners and risk managers of the 733 
organizations, those that actually answered the survey were: Risk Managers (N=51), Owners 
(N=44), Presidents and Vice Presidents (N=39), Chief Executive Officers (N=34), Executive 
Directors (N=12), Principals (N=12), Administrators (N=6), Religious Leaders (N=4), and others 
(N=7).2 We assume that these respondents are knowledgeable about their organizations 
(including knowledge of risk management issues) and that their responses on the survey 
represent their organizations’ views.   
 
Variable Measurement: Dependent Variable 
 
Hazard adjustments 
Hazard adjustments were operationalized by 10 disaster mitigation and preparedness activities 
(see Table 1). This dependent variable was assessed by the responses to the question: “Has your 
organization engaged in any of these activities over the past year?” Respondents could either 
answer “yes” or “no”. A ten-item index was generated by summing together the responses for 
each organization (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). An alternative formulation of the ten mitigation 
and preparedness activities–active and passive measures–was also developed (see Table 1) based 
on previous work by Sadiq (2010) and Sadiq and Noonan (2015). One index each was created 
for active and passive measures by adding the active measures together (Cronbach’s alpha = 
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0.81) and the passive measures together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83). Active measures are those 
activities that involve an organization actually doing something to address its risks. Passive 
measures are activities that involve an organization simply discussing or mentioning hazard 
adjustments that need to be taken. Active measures are more capable of reducing the impacts of 
disasters on organizations than passive measures. As a result, organizations that adopt active 
measures may stand a better chance of surviving disasters in comparison to those that adopt 
passive measures only.  
 
Table 1. Active and Passive Hazard Adjustments. 
 
Hazard Adjustments  
Active  
 
1. Attended disaster meetings/training courses outside your 
organization 
2. Held disaster-related workshops/training within your 
organization 
3. Arranged site visits by consultants or experts to better 
prepare for disasters 
4. Provided information to customers/members of the 
community on issues related to disasters 
5. Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or 
estimated potential losses from disasters 
6. Engaged in non-structural mitigation measures (e.g., 
securing computers) 
7. Engaged in structural mitigation measures (e.g., 
strengthening parts of a building) 
 
Passive  
 
1. Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting 
2. Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term 
responses to disasters 
3. Discussed in an organizational meeting long-term 
strategies for recovery from disasters 
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Variable Measurement: Independent Variables 
 
Presence of a risk manager  
The study is not the first to use the presence of a risk manager as an independent variable to 
explain hazard adjustment adoption. Yoon, Youngs, and Abe, (2012) used the number of 
emergency management specialists/emergency managers (same as risk managers) as an 
independent variable for explaining the development of FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation 
Plans. The presence of a risk manager in this study is measured by responses to the following 
question: “Does your organization have a risk manager?” Respondents could either answer “yes” 
or “no”. As an independent variable, it is coded 1 for organizations that have a risk manager and 
0 for organizations that do not have a risk manager or that have decentralized risk management 
responsibilities. 
Risk Perception 
This variable is assessed by responses to the following question: “Using the thermometer scale 
below, please indicate the extent to which you perceive the following disasters are a worry for 
your organization”, on a scale of 0 (no worry at all), 50 (moderate worry), and 100 (a great deal 
of worry). The survey listed fifteen different disasters (Bird flu/pandemics, chemical spills, 
drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, extreme winds/tornadoes, fires, flooding, hurricanes, ice 
storms, severe storms, terrorist attacks, toxic releases, violent crimes, and water pollution). An 
index was created by adding together the responses for all fifteen disasters (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.89). 
 
 
 
19 
 
Variable Measurement: Control Variables 
 
The previous literature suggests other variables may be important predictors of hazard 
adjustments. The following variables were controlled for–organizational size, ownership pattern, 
organizational sector (education, health, and wholesale/retail trade sectors), disaster impacts, and 
internal organizational obstacles. 
Organizational Size 
This variable was measured as the number of full-time employees in an organization. Memphis 
Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the information. 
Ownership Pattern and Organizational Sector 
Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce also provided information on whether an 
organization is a single firm or part of a franchise, and the sector to which an organization 
belongs. 
Disaster Impact  
This variable was generated from responses to the following question: “Please indicate the extent 
to which the following disaster impacts might adversely affect your organization” on a five-point 
scale, with 1 indicating minor adverse impact and 5 indicating major adverse impact. The 
thirteen disaster impacts are: (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in supplies or deliveries, (iii) 
inability to communicate with employees, (iv) inadequate number of employees, (v) loss of 
commercial goods, (vi) loss of customers, (vii) loss of data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life 
support (food, water, etc.), (x) loss relative to competitor’s loss, (xi) power outage, (xii) 
structural damage, (xiii) transportation disruption. An index, mean disaster impact, was created 
for this variable by adding together the values for all thirteen disaster impacts (Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.81) and dividing by thirteen. 
20 
 
Internal Organizational Obstacles 
The values of this independent variable were generated from responses to the following survey 
question: “Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are obstacles to disaster 
planning in your organization”: (a) lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters, (b) lack of 
support from upper-level management within your organization, (c) lack of support from mid-
and lower-level organizational members, (d) lack of information about the frequency and 
magnitude of disasters, (e) lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of 
disasters, (f) unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation. The scale of 
the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major obstacle). An index, the mean of all the obstacles, was 
created by adding together the values for all the obstacles (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) and dividing 
by six.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
Prior to carrying out the statistical analyses, this study makes two assumptions. First, some 
organizations in the sample may have gotten rid of some unmeasured hazard adjustments. Those 
organizations are regarded as having negative values for mitigation and preparedness measures. 
Second, there are some organizations in the sample that engaged in more than ten mitigation and 
preparedness measures over the past year. For instance, some organizations might have stored 
water and food in addition to adopting all ten mitigation and preparedness measures. The sample 
was restricted during the analyses by bounding the dependent variable between zero (lower limit) 
and ten (upper limit). In other words, the dependent variable is censored from both left and right, 
meaning that one cannot observe organizations that are below zero or above ten.  
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Prior to the multivariate regressions, a correlation analysis was carried out among all the 
variables. The goal of the correlation analysis is to understand the relationship between the 
dependent variable and each of the independent variables. After the correlation analysis, a Tobit 
regression was estimated to answer the two research questions. Tobit is the appropriate technique 
for analysing censored samples because it gives a precise estimate of the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables (Gujarati 2011). In addition, an OLS regression was 
estimated for comparison to the Tobit results. Finally, a Logit regression was used to understand 
the relationship between individual mitigation and preparedness measures and the presence of a 
risk manager as well as between individual mitigation and preparedness measures and risk 
perception. Logit is appropriate in this case because of the binary nature of the responses.  
 
Results 
 
According to Table 2, organizations in the sample adopted an average of 4.7 out of 10 hazard 
adjustments. About 44 per cent of organizations in the sample have a risk manager and 
approximately 56 per cent do not have a risk manager. With regard to risk perception, the mean 
risk perception for the sample is about 457 and the maximum is 1365 (standard deviation = 
285.31).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Hazard Adjustments  206  4.74  3.27  0  10 
Risk Manager   207  .44  .50  0  1 
Risk Perception   224  456.90  285.31  0  1365 
Single Location   218  .78  .42  0  1 
Employee Size   215  5.79  2.08  1  11 
Mean Disaster Impact  220  3.64  .76  1  5 
Mean Obstacle   212  2.51  1.37  0  5 
Educational Sector  225  .08  .27  0  1 
Health Sector   225  .16  .36  0  1 
Whole Sale/Retail Sector 225  .15  .36    0  1 
 
Table 3 presents the intercorrelations among all the variables. There is a significant and 
positive association between the adoption of hazard adjustments and the presence of a risk 
manager (.58). Similarly, there is a significant and positive association between hazard 
adjustments and risk perception (.38).  
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Table 3. Intercorrelations Among All Variables (N=180) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Hazard 
Adjustmen
ts  
1.00          
2. Risk 
Manager 
0.58 1.00         
3. Risk 
Perception 
0.38   0.23 1.00        
4. Single 
Location  
-0.28 -0.29 -0.22 1.00       
5. Employee 
Size 
0.48 0.28 0.21 -0.11 1.00      
6. Mean 
Disaster 
Impact  
0.12 0.11 0.41 0.11 0.11 1.00     
7. Mean 
Obstacle 
-0.27 -0.18 0.02 0.01 -0.11 0.26 1.00    
8. Educationa
l Sector 
0.20 0.24 0.07 0.16 0.10 -0.07 0.05 1.00   
9. Health 
Sector  
0.10 0.02   -0.00 0.17 0.14 0.09 -0.04 -0.13 1.00  
10. Whole 
Sale/Retail 
Sector  
-0.34 -0.19 -0.15 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.09 -0.12 -0.18 1.00 
All significant correlation at p<.05 level are highlighted in gray.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the OLS (both unstandardized and standardized 
coefficients) and Tobit regressions. Both models show that having a risk manager significantly 
increases the likelihood of adopting hazard adjustments. Taking the OLS result as an example, 
holding all other variables constant, the presence of a risk manager is associated with a 2.06 
increase in the number of hazard adjustments. The other variable of interest, risk perception, has 
a positive and significant relationship with the adoption of hazard adjustments in both models. 
The OLS results indicate that, holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in risk 
perception increases the number of hazard adjustments adopted by 0.0017. Single location, mean 
obstacle to disaster planning, and wholesale/retail sector all have negative and significant 
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relationships with hazard adjustments. In addition, employee size and educational sector have 
positive and significant relationships with hazard adjustments.  
Table 4. Ordinary Least Square and Tobit Regression Results.  
Note ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p <0.05 
 
The results of the active and passive Tobit analyses indicate that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between having a risk manager and the adoption of both active and passive 
measures. Also, organizational risk perception is associated with the adoption of both active and 
passive measures. Further, the results of the ten Logit regressions show that having a risk 
Variable OLS Beta (OLS) Tobit 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Risk Manager 2.06*** 
(.3842) 
.32 2.22*** 
(.4640) 
Risk Perception .00* 
(.0007) 
.14 .00* 
(.0009) 
Single Location -1.30**   
 (.4465) 
-.17 -1.59** 
(.5404) 
Employee Size .49*** 
(.0859) 
.31 .59*** 
(.1045) 
Mean Disaster Impact  -.04   
 (.2564) 
-.01 -.11 
(.3127) 
Mean Obstacle -.37**   
(.1282) 
-.16 -.42** 
(.1556) 
Educational Sector 1.18 
(.6348) 
.11 1.28 
(.7606) 
Health Sector .47 
(.4737) 
.05 .68 
(.5662) 
Wholesale/Retail Sector -1.70***    
(.4808) 
-.19 -2.30***  
(.6015) 
Constant 2.32* 
(1.0861) 
 1.99 
(1.3142) 
Observations 
 
180  180 
Adj. R2 (Prob. > F = 0.0000) 
 
.53   
Pseudo R2 (Prob. > Chi2 = 0.0000)   .15 
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manager is associated with eight of the ten hazard adjustments. In addition, risk perception is 
significantly associated with four of the ten hazard adjustments.  
 
Discussion 
 
The results of the intercorrelations support those obtained from the OLS and Tobit regressions. 
The OLS and Tobit analyses provide empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. That is 
hiring a risk manager is positively associated with the adoption of hazard adjustments. On the 
contrary, the OLS and Tobit regressions do not provide empirical evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2 or the paper plan syndrome/false sense of security/fantasy document. In other 
words, there is no indication that organizations in our sample are hiring risk managers for the 
purpose of creating a false sense of security. Rather, the results suggest that organizations that 
have risk managers are more likely than organizations without risk managers to adopt hazard 
adjustments. Further, the results from the active and passive analyses suggest that hiring a risk 
manager is positively associated with the adoption of both active and passive hazard adjustments.  
The intercorrelations result between hazard adjustment and risk perception corroborates 
those from the OLS and Tobit regressions. The OLS and Tobit results provide empirical 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, and suggest that organizational risk perception is positively 
associated with the adoption of hazard adjustments, although the effect sizes are small. This 
finding is in agreement with those of previous studies on risk perception (Han and Nigg, 2011; 
Sadiq, 2009) as well as with the Crisis Management Process Model proposition (Pearson and 
Clair, 1998). Finally, the results from the active and passive hazard adjustments analyses indicate 
that organizational risk perception is associated with the adoption of both active and passive 
measures. Although risk perception has a medium sized correlation with hazard adjustment, its 
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incremental effect is small when included with risk manager and employee size. These results 
are in line with Solberg Rossetto, and Joffe’s (2010) conclusion that previous studies have found 
a weak relationship between seismic risk and seismic adjustments.  
The significant relationship demonstrated by this study suggests that risk managers could 
make a big difference when it comes to adopting hazard adjustments in organizations, 
particularly proactive measures that can actually reduce the impacts of disasters on 
organizations. Nonetheless, it is important for the risk manager to recognize the importance of 
involving other departments in current and future risk management programs. A prerequisite for 
the success of any risk management approach is collaboration between the risk management 
office and the entire cadre of employees in other departments. Such collaboration, at a minimum, 
may build trust, improve coordination, and ultimately, make the organization more effective in 
reducing disaster risks.   
The finding regarding the relationship between hazard adjustments and organization size 
is quite interesting and consistent across the correlation analysis, OLS regression, and the Tobit 
regression. According to all three analyses, there is a significant and positive relationship 
between the two variables. In addition, organization size has the biggest beta coefficient among 
all the independent variables. This robust finding is in line with the results of myriad studies on 
hazard adjustments (Quarantelli et al., 1979; Sadiq, 2010, 2015). The reason for this result, 
according to researchers is that larger organizations have more resources than smaller 
organizations that they can devote to the adoption of hazard adjustments (Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza, 1997; Mileti and Darlington, 1997; Tierney, 2006).   
As with any empirical study, there are some limitations to the current study. First, 
because the study is based in Memphis/Shelby County region, the results are not easily 
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generalizable to other parts of the country or the world. Second, the “presence of a risk manager” 
measure is likely to capture organizations with a centralized risk management function, but is 
unlikely to capture organizations that spread their risk management function across multiple jobs 
in various departments (decentralized structure). Third, because the data were collected in 2006, 
the findings may not reflect current risk perceptions and preparedness levels among 
organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee. Fourth, this study establishes an 
association between the presence of a risk manager and the adoption of risk-reducing 
measures. Such association does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship running from the 
manager to the measures. It is quite possible that some reverse causation is operating. Moreover, 
in a cross-sectional survey of organizations, we cannot discern whether the risk manager was 
hired prior to the adoption of risk-reducing measures or whether the manager may have been 
hired after the measures were adopted. Fifth, our treatment of organizations might suggest that 
they are all the same. Although, we controlled for organizational characteristics like size and 
industry, there are other organizational characteristics we did not control for such as 
organizational culture. Finally, there are some determinants of organizational mitigation and 
preparedness not included in the analysis due to unavailable information. These determinants are 
previous experience with disasters (Barlow, 1993; Drabek, 1994a; Drabek, 1994b), whether a 
business leases or owns the property where they operate (Dahlhamer and D’Souza, 1997), the 
age of an organization (Drabek, 1991; Quarantelli et al., 1979), and industry regulations (Pearson 
and Clair, 1998). With regard to industry regulations, Pearson and Clair’s (1998) comprehensive 
model of crisis management process suggests that industry regulations could mandate 
organizations to adopt risk-reducing measures (Person and Clair, 1998). Despite these 
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limitations, this study adds encouraging empirical information to the literature on organizational 
perception and management of natural and technological risks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether a designated risk manager is associated with a 
stronger portfolio of hazard adjustments and whether organizational risk perception is associated 
with the adoption of hazard adjustments. This study finds a significant positive relationship 
between the presence of risk managers and the adoption of hazard adjustments. The results also 
indicate that organizational risk perception has a small positive influence on the adoption of 
hazard adjustments. 
The data collected by the research team and used in this study are unique in two ways. 
First, most studies on disaster preparedness focus on specific hazards (Mileti, 1999). Our data 
contain information on mitigation and preparedness measures for multiple types of technological 
risks and natural hazards. Secondly, very few researchers have collected data on organizational 
behaviour in relation to disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. 
Future research should seek to control for a broader range of predictors of organizational 
preparedness such as industry regulations (Pearson and Clair, 1998) as well as organizational 
structures, size, complexity, and management attitudes towards risk. Also, future studies should 
examine whether the type of risk manager matters (e.g., full-time versus part-time and placement 
within the organization) and whether the resources allocated to risk managers have an impact. By 
isolating which aspects of the risk manager’s role are most important, researchers can provide 
clues about how a culture of risk management may be infused into all units within an 
organization (Ward, 2001). Furthermore, future research should be undertaken to uncover why 
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some organizations hire risk managers and others do not. Moreover, some time-series 
information on risk managers and the adoption of measures would be useful in shedding light on 
some of the complicated causation issues (Siegrist, 2013). Lastly, researchers should replicate 
this study and examine whether or not organizational risk perceptions and preparedness levels 
have changed since the data for this study were collected. It would also be valuable to exploit 
nationally representative samples. In so doing, we may be able to gain a better understanding of 
the predictors of hazard adjustments and produce generalizable findings.  
 
References 
Alberto, A. (2011), Governing Disasters: The Challenges of Emergency Risk Regulation, 
Edward Elgar, North Hampton, Massachusetts. 
Auf der Heide, E. (1989), Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination. Erik 
Auf der Heide, Atlanta, Georgia, 
http://sheltercentre.org/sites/default/files/CVMosby_DisasterResponsePrinciples.pdf  
(accessed 15 November 2014). 
Barlow, H. (1993), ‘Safety Officer Accounts of Earthquake Preparedness at Riverside Industrial 
Sites’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 11, Number 3, 
pp. 421-435. 
Bostrom, A., Turaga, M. R. and Ponomariov, B. (2006), ‘Earthquake Mitigation Decisions and 
Consequences’, Earthquake Spectra, Volume 22, Number 2, pp. 313-327.  
Bubeck, P. W., Botzen, J. W. and Aerts, J. H. (2012), ‘A Review of Risk Perceptions and Other 
Factors that Influence Flood Mitigation Behaviour’, Risk Analysis, Volume 32, Number 
9, pp. 1481–1495.  
Chikoto, G. L., Sadiq A. A. and Fordyce, E. (2012), ‘Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness: 
Comparison of Nonprofit, Public, and Private Organizations’, Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, Volume 42, Number 2, pp. 391-410.  
Clarke, L. B. (1999), Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Document to Tame Disaster, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences. (2006), Facing Hazards and Disasters: 
Understanding Human Dimensions, National Academy of Sciences/National Research 
Council, Washington DC. 
Corbett, R. B. (2004), ‘A View of the Future of Risk Management’, Risk Management, Volume 
6, Number 3, pp. 51-56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867778 (accessed 15 November 
2014). 
 
30 
 
Dahlhamer, J. M. and D’Souza, M. J. (1997), ‘Determinants of Business Disaster Preparedness 
in Two U.S. Metropolitan Areas’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters, Volume 15, Number 2, pp. 265-281, 
http://www.ijmed.org/articles/333/download/ (accessed 12 December 2014). 
Dillman, D. A. (2000), Mail and Internet Surveys: The Total Design Method, Wiley, New York. 
Drabek, T. E. (1991), ‘Anticipating Organizational Evacuations: Disaster Planning by Managers 
of Tourist-Oriented Private Firms’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters, Volume 9, Number 2, pp. 219-245, 
http://www.ijmed.org/articles/413/download/ (accessed 5 April 2015) 
Drabek, T. E. (1994a), ‘New Study Shows That Growing Tourist Industry is Inadequately 
Prepared for Emergencies’, Hazard Technology, Volume 14, Number 1, pp. 17-21. 
Drabek, T. E. (1994b), Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry, Institute of Behavioral 
Science, University of Colorado.  
Drabek, T. E. (1995), ‘Disaster Responses Within the Tourist Industry’, International Journal of 
Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 13, Number 1, pp. 7-23, 
http://www.ijmed.org/articles/484/download/ (5 April 2015). 
Dynes, R. R. and Drabek, T. E. (1994), ‘The Structure of Disaster Research: Its Policy and 
Disciplinary Implications’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 
Volume 12, Number 1, pp. 5-23, http://www.ijmed.org/articles/424/download/ 
 (accessed 5 March 2015). 
Fowler, K. L., Kling, N. D. and Larson, M. D. (2007), ‘Organizational Preparedness for Coping 
With a Major Crisis or Disaster’, Business and Society, Volume 46, Number 1, pp. 88-
103.  
Grothmann, T. and Reusswig, F. (2006), ‘People at Risk of Flooding: Why Some Residents Take 
Precautionary Action While Others Do Not’, Natural Hazards, Volume 38, Number 1, 
pp. 101–120.  
Guha-Sapir, D., Vos, F., Below, R. and Ponserre, S. (2012), Annual Disaster Statistical Review 
2011: The Numbers and Trends, Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 
Brussels, http://cred.be/sites/default/files/2012.07.05.ADSR_2011.pdf (accessed 5 April 
2014). 
Gujarati, D. (2011), Econometrics by Example, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, UK. 
Hage, J. (1965), ‘An Axiomatic Theory of Organizations’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 289-320, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391470  (accessed 5 
January 2015). 
Han, Z. and Nigg, J. (2011), ‘The Influences of Business and Decision Makers’ Characteristics 
on Disaster Preparedness—A Study on the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake’, International 
Journal of Disaster Risk Science, Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 22-31.  
Helsloot, I. and Ruitenberg, A. (2004), ‘Citizen Response to Disasters: a Survey of Literature 
and Some Practical Implications’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 
Volume 12, Number 3, pp. 98-111. 
Huss, S., Sadiq, A. A. and Weible, C. (2012), ‘Organizations and Emergency Management: 
Information, Trust, and Preparedness’, Journal of Emergency Management, Volume 10, 
Number 5, pp. 359-372. 
31 
 
Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Marais, K. and Carroll, J. (2009), ‘Moving Beyond Normal Accidents 
and High Reliability Organizations: A Systems Approach to Safety in Complex Systems’, 
Organization Studies, Volume 30, Numbers 2-3, pp. 227-249.  
Light, P. C. (2008), Predicting Organizational Crisis Readiness: Perspectives and Practices 
Toward a Pathway to Preparedness, New York's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness 
and Response, New York. 
Lindell, M. K. (2013), ‘North American Cities at Risk: Household Responses to Environmental 
Hazards’, in Rosetto, T., Joffe, H. and Adams, J. (Ed.), Cities at Risk: Living with Perils 
in the 21st Century, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 109-130. 
Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. (2000), ‘Household Adjustment to Earthquake Hazard: A 
Review of Research’, Environment and Behavior, Volume 32, Number 4, pp. 590-630.  
Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. (2007), ‘Planning and Preparedness’, in Waugh, W. and Tierney, 
K. (Ed.), Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Governments (2nd 
edition), ICMA Press, Washington, DC, pp. 113-139. 
Major, A. M. (1998), ‘The Utility of Situational Theory of Publics for Assessing Public 
Response to a Disaster Prediction’, Public Relations Review, Volume 24, Number 4, pp. 
489-508. 
May, P. J. and Birkland, T. A. (1994), ‘Earthquake Risk Reduction: An Examination of Local 
Regulatory Efforts’, Environmental Management, Volume 18, Number 6, pp. 923-927. 
McManus, D. J. and Carr, H. H. (2001), ‘Risk and the Need for Business Continuity Planning’, 
in Doughty, K. (Ed.), Business Continuity Planning: Protecting your Organization’s Life, 
Auerbach Publications, Boca Raton, pp. 3-10. 
Mileti, D. S. (1999), Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United 
States, Joseph Henry Press, Washington DC. 
Mileti, D. S. and Darlington, J. D. (1997), ‘The Role of Searching Behavior in Response to 
Earthquake Risk Information’, Social Problems, Volume 44, Number 1, pp. 89-103. 
Mileti, D. S., Darlington, J. D., Fitzpatrick, C. and O’Brien, P. W. (1993), Communicating 
Earthquake Risk: Societal Response to Revised Probabilities in the Bay Area. Fort 
Collins: Hazard Assessment Laboratory and Dept. of Sociology, Colorado State 
University. 
Milne S., Sheeran P., and Orbell S. (2000), ‘Prediction and intervention in health-related 
behavior: A meta-analytic review of protection motivation theory’, Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, Volume 30, Number 1,106–143. 
Mitchell, V. W. (1995), ‘Organizational Risk Perception and Reduction: A Literature Review’, 
British Journal of Management, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 115-133. 
Munich Reinsurance Group. (2008), Annual report 2008: Knowledge at Work, 
http://www.munichre.com/publications/302-05985_en.pdf (accessed 5 May 2014). 
Nigg, J. M. (1996), The Social Impacts of Physical Processes: How Do we Manage What we 
Can’t Control? (Preliminary Paper), Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, 
Newark. 
Pearce, R. (2013), ‘False Sense of Security Pervades DR Approaches: Survey Indicates Business 
Too Optimistic about Recovery Times’, TechWorld, 
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/453993/false_sense_security_pervades_dr_approac
hes/ (accessed 15 April 2014).  
32 
 
Pearson, C. M. and Clair, J. A. (1998), ‘Reframing Crisis Management’, Academy of 
Management Review, Volume 23, Number 1, pp. 59-76. 
Penrose, J. M. (2000), ‘The Role of Perception in Crisis Planning’, Public Relations Review, 
Volume 26, Number 2, pp. 155-165.  
Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. (1997), ‘Earthquake Planning for Governmental Continuity’, 
Environmental Management, Volume 21, Number 1, pp, 89-96.  
Perry, R. W. and Lindell, M. K. (2008), ‘Volcanic Risk Perception and Adjustment in a Multi-
Hazard Environment’, Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, Volume 172, 
Numbers 3-4, pp. 170-178. 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. R. (1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, Harper and Row, New York. 
Quarantelli, E. L., Lawrence, C., Tierney, K. and Johnson, T. (1979), Initial Findings from a 
Study of Socio-Behavioral Preparations and Planning for Acute Chemical Hazard 
Disasters, Disaster Research Center, Department of Sociology, Ohio State University. 
Rogers, R. W. (1975), ‘A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change’, 
Journal of Psychology, Volume 91, Number 1, pp. 93–114. 
Rogers, R. W. (1983), ‘Cognitive and Physiological Processes in Fear Appeals and Attitude 
Change: A Revised Theory of Protection Motivation’, in Cacioppo, B. and Petty, R., 
(Ed.), Social Psychophysiology: A Sourcebook, Guilford Press, London, pp. 153-176. 
Sadiq, A. A. (2009), ‘Mitigating and Preparing for Disasters: A Survey of Memphis 
Organizations’, PhD diss., Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Sadiq, A. A. (2010), ‘Digging Through Disaster Rubble in Search of the Determinants of 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness’, Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 
Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 33-62. 
Sadiq, A. A. (2011), ‘Adoption of Hazard Adjustments by Large and Small Organizations: Who 
is Doing the Talking and Who is Doing the Walking?’, Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public 
Policy, Volume 2, Number 3, pp. 1-17. 
Sadiq, A. A. and Noonan, D. S. (2015), ‘Local Capacity and Resilience to Flooding: Community 
Responsiveness to the Community Ratings System Program Incentives’, Natural 
Hazards, Volume 78, Number 2, pp.1-16. 
Sadiq A. A, Tharp, K. and Graham, J. (2015). ‘FEMA versus Local Governments: Influence and 
Reliance on Disaster Preparedness’, Natural Hazards. DOI:10.1007/s11069-016-2183-6. 
Sadiq, A. A. and Weible, C. (2010), ‘Obstacles and Disaster Risk Reduction: Survey of Memphis 
Organizations’, Natural Hazards Review, Volume 11, Number 3, pp. 110-117. 
Sandman, P. M., Weinstein, N. D. and Miller, P. (1994), ‘High Risk or Low: How Location on a 
“Risk Ladder” Affects Perceived Risk’, Risk Analysis, Volume 14, Number 1, pp. 35-45. 
Schulman, P. R. and Roe, E. (2007), ‘Designing Infrastructures: Dilemmas of Design and the 
Reliability of Critical Infrastructures’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 
Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 42-49. 
Shafritz, J. M., Ott, J. S. and Jang, Y. S. (2005), Classics of Organizational Theory (Sixth ed.), 
Wadsworth, Boston. 
Siegrist, M. (2013), ‘The Necessity for Longitudinal Studies in Risk Perception Research’, Risk 
analysis, Volume 23, Number 1, pp. 50-51.  
Siegrist, M. and Cvetkovich, G. (2000), ‘Perception of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and 
Knowledge’, Risk analysis, Volume 20, Number 5, pp. 713-720. 
33 
 
Siegrist, M. and Gutscher, H. (2006), ‘Flooding Risks: A Comparison of Lay People’s 
Perceptions and Expert’s Assessments in Switzerland’, Risk Analysis, Volume 26, 
Number 4, pp. 971-979. 
Slovic, P. (1987), ‘Perception of Risk’, Science, Volume 236, Number 4799, pp. 280-285. 
Slovic, P. (2000), The Perception of Risk: Risk, Society, and Policy Series, Earthscan, London. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. and Lichtenstein, S. (1980), ‘Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived 
Risk’, in R. Schwing and W. Albers (Ed.), Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe 
Enough, Plenum Press, pp. 181-214. 
Solberg, C., Rossetto, T., and Joffe, H. (2010), ‘The Social Psychology of Seismic Hazard 
Adjustment: Re-evaluating the International Literature’, Natural Hazards Earth System 
Science. Volume 10, Number 8, pp. 1633–1677.  
Tierney, K. J. (1994), Business Vulnerability and Disruption: Data from the 1993 Midwest 
Floods, Paper presented at the 41st North American Meetings of the Regional Science 
Association International. 
Tierney, K. J. (2006), ‘Businesses and Disasters: Vulnerability, Impact, and Recovery’, in E. L. 
QuarantellI, H. Rodriquez and D. Russell (Ed.), Handbook of Disaster Research, 
Springer, pp. 275-296. 
Vitez, O. (2014), ‘Centralized Vs. Decentralized Organizational Structure’, Chron, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/centralized-vs-decentralized-organizational-structure-
2785.html (accessed 2 June 2014 ).  
Wachinger, G., Renn, O., Begg, C. and Kuhlicke, C. (2013), ‘The Risk Perception Paradox—
Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards’, Risk Analysis, 
Volume 33, Number 6, pp. 1049-1065. 
Ward, S. (2001), ‘Exploring the Role of the Corporate Risk Manager’, Risk Management, 
Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 7-25. 
Webb, G. R., Tierney, K. J. and Dahlhamer, J. M. (2000), ‘Business and Disasters: Empirical 
Patterns and Unanswered Questions’, Natural Hazards Review, Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 
83-90. 
Whitney, D. J., Dickerson, A. and Lindell, M. K. (2001), ‘Non-structural seismic preparedness of 
Southern California hospitals’, Earthquake Spectra, Volume 17, Number 1, pp. 153-171. 
Wyner, A. J. and Mann, D. E. (1986), Preparing for California’s Earthquakes: Local 
Government and Seismic Safety. Institute of Governmental Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Yoon, D. K., Youngs, G. A. Jr.,, and Abe, D. (2012), ‘Examining Factors Contributing to 
the Development of FEMA-Approved Hazard Mitigation Plans’, Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, Article 14. DOI: 
10.1515/1547-7355.2010 
Zaharia, P. (2012), ‘From Centralization to Crisis Decentralization in Public Administration 
Management-An Epistemological Approach’, The USV Annals of Economic and Public 
Administration, Volume 12, Number 15, pp. 271-276. 
1 The research team was interested in understanding the preparedness levels in this particular critical  
infrastructure because utility companies play a crucial role in the response and recovery of communities following a 
disaster. 
2 Job title information was not available for 18 out of the 227 respondents. 
                                                          
